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The future of the Franco-German tandem
Artur Ciechanowicz, Rafał Sadowski
Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and 
the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of re-
lations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy 
duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who 
had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnes-
sing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on 
making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the 
eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members 
(as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known 
as the fiscal pact).
However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total bre-
akdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François 
Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ 
exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship af-
fected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their eco-
nomies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both 
sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals 
in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to 
maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the 
same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s 
political and economic superiority.
Two strategies for fighting the crisis
During	the	presidential	campaign	in	France,	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	openly	supported	Nico-
las	Sarkozy1.	Merkel	and	Sarkozy	were	united	by	their	vision	of	how	to	tackle	the	crisis	in	the	
eurozone.	The	Chancellor	supported	the	structural	reforms	announced	by	Sarkozy,	which	en-
visaged	a	programme	of	spending	cuts	according	to	the	German	model.	Sarkozy’s	re-election	
would	have	reinforced	this	decision-making	model	in	the	EU,	where	Paris	and	Berlin	make	
the	most	important	decisions,	with	some	assistance	from	the	eurozone	states.	It	is	worth	not-
ing,	however,	that	during	the	long	period	of	his	presidency	Sarkozy	opposed	Merkel	on	most	
issues	regarding	the	anti-crisis	measures.	What	made	him	change	his	mind	was	fear	of	the	
unpredictable	reactions	of	the	markets,	of	a	further	downgrading	of	France’s	credit	rating,	and	
of	losing	support	in	the	opinion	polls.	The	close	coordination	between	Paris	and	Berlin	before	
the	successive	EU	summits	seemed	to	be	calming	the	moods	on	stock	exchanges.
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The	new	French	President	François	Hollande	has	partially	altered	the	policy	of	his	predeces-
sor.	To	be	more	precise,	he	has	actually	returned	to	Sarkozy’s	style	of	policies	before	France	
lost	 its	 highest	 credit	 rating.	 The	 change	 affected	 both	 bilateral	 relations	with	Germany	
and	policy	within	 the	EU.	President	Hollande	 insisted	 that	 the	 fiscal	 pact	 be	 completed	
with	provisions	for	growth-stimulating	mechanisms.	In	practice,	this	would	not	only	result	
in	a	commitment	to	cut	costs,	but	would	also	permit	loans	to	be	taken	that	could	be	used	
for	investing	in	the	countries	in	crisis,	and	increase	their	access	to	funds.	The	€120-billion	
‘growth	package’	proposed	by	Hollande	in	his	letter	to	the	EU	leaders	would	be	financed	
from	three	sources:	€55	billion	from	unused	structural	funds	(redistributing	the	funds	origi-
nally	intended	for	the	new	EU	members	would	be	an	unprecedented	move),	€60	billion	from	
the	European	 Investment	Bank,	and	€4.5	billion	 from	bonds	 issued	 to	 finance	structural	
projects	(the	so-called	project	bonds).
Germany	strongly	opposes	the	issue	of	Eurobonds,	which	would	be	guaranteed	by	all	the	
eurozone	states,	and	would	thus	be	more	accessible	and	cheaper	for	the	countries	threat-
ened	by	the	crisis.	However,	Eurobonds	would	simultaneously	increase	the	cost	of	obtaining	
funds	 for	Germany.	Berlin	will	only	agree	
to	 the	 issue	 of	 so-called	 project	 bonds,	
which	 would	 be	 used	 for	 infrastructural	
investments.	However,	this	is	not	enough	
for	 France,	 which	 wants	 access	 to	 the	
cheapest	loans	in	order	to	reduce	the	risk	
of	 speculation	 and	 lower	 the	 debt	 cost	
differences	 among	 the	 eurozone	 states2.	
At	the	informal	EU	summit	in	Brussels	on	
23	May,	 Angela	 Merkel	 argued	 that	 Eu-
robonds	are	incompatible	with	the	acquis 
and	will	not	contribute	to	growth,	possibly	only	temporarily	masking	the	crisis	(which	will	
return	sooner	or	later,	due	to	some	states’	inefficient	financial	systems).
Another	 sticking	point	 concerns	 the	methods	 for	 granting	 support	 to	 the	banking	 sector.	
The	French	proposal	envisages	the	possibility	of	directly	recapitalising	banks	from	the	Euro-
pean	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM)	with	capital	of	€500	billion	euros.	Germany	opposes	this	
proposal,	and	argues	that	supporting	banks	from	the	ESM	alone,	without	the	involvement	of	
the	national	budgets,	will	not	motivate	those	governments	to	implement	reforms.	According	
to	Hollande’s	proposal,	the	ESM	reserves	should	be	replenished	by	the	European	Central	
Bank	(the	ESM	would	be	granted	a	banking	license,	and	could	incur	loans	in	the	ECB).
In	mid-June,	in	response	to	the	stance	adopted	by	Paris,	Chancellor	Merkel	publicly	criti-
cised	the	policy	of	the	French	government	for	the	first	time,	accusing	it	of	not	helping	to	
counteract	the	crisis3.	Germany	is	concerned	with	the	changes	which	the	left-wing	French	
government	has	introduced	into	its	domestic	economic	policy	and	which	increase	expendi-
ture,	 such	 as	 lowering	 the	 retirement	 age	 to	 60	 (although	Hollande	 keeps	 promising	 to	
reduce	the	budget	deficit).
A reconfiguration of alliances
Hollande’s	 strategy	 involves	 departing	 from	 the	 close	 coordination	 of	 action	 exclusively	
with	 the	 Germans	while	 ignoring	 the	 remaining	 EU	members,	 as	 was	 demonstrated	 by	
the	 president-elect’s	 meeting	 with	 Mariano	 Rajoy,	 Spain’s	 right-wing	 Prime	 Minister.	
The	two	politicians	met	before	the	informal	EU	summit	of	23	May	and	travelled	from	Paris	
to	Brussels	together	by	train.	In	order	to	put	pressure	on	the	Germans,	the	French	leader	
has	established	a	close	cooperation	with	Spain	and	Italy,	who	have	expressed	their	support	
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2	 In	May	Spain	issued	bonds	
with	an	interest	rate	of	6.1%	
per	year,	while	Germany’s	rate	
stood	at	0%;	for	the	first	time	
in	history,	no	regular	return	
was	offered.
3	 http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/report-on-business/
merkel-takes-swipe-at-france-
as-debt-crisis-tensions-grow/
article4265674/
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for	Hollande’s	proposals.	France’s	position	was	also	supported	by	the	European	Commis-
sion	(which	backed	the	idea	of	jointly	guaranteed	Eurobonds),	as	well	as	the	International	
Monetary	Fund,	which	urged	to	immediately	counteract	the	panic	on	the	financial	markets.
At	the	same	time,	Hollande	is	looking	for	allies	on	the	German	domestic	scene.	He	has	good	
relations	with	the	opposition	Social	Democratic	Party	(SPD),	whose	leaders	he	invited	to	
a	meeting	in	Paris	on	13	June.	This	could	
be	 seen	 as	 a	 demonstration	 that	 Angela	
Merkel’s	 government	 is	 not	 his	 only	Ger-
man	 partner	 in	 the	 talks.	 In	 an	 inter-
view	for	the	Financial Times on	24	June,	
Sigmar	Gabriel,	 one	of	 the	Social	Demo-
crats’	leaders	and	a	possible	rival	to	Ange-
la	Merkel	in	next	year’s	elections,	support-
ed	 the	 introduction	 of	 mechanisms	 that	
would	reduce	the	costs	of	debts	incurred	
by	the	eurozone	states,	 thus	meeting	the	
expectations	of	France	and	Italy.	He	also	endorsed	the	agreement	on	the	growth	strategy,	
but	objected	to	Eurobonds,	arguing	that	they	are	incompatible	with	the	German	constitution.
Back to the old sticking points in the Franco-German relations
In	the	long	term,	the	relations	between	Merkel	and	Hollande	will	not	be	shaped	solely	by	the	
anti-crisis	policies.	There	are	many	areas	where	both	states	have	had	a	completely	divergent	
positions	 for	years;	but	 the	priority	of	 fighting	 the	 financial	crisis	has	made	 these	 issues	
secondary	in	the	public	debate.	However,	they	did	affect	the	dynamics	of	Franco-German	
relations	even	during	Sarkozy’s	term	of	office.
During	the	European	Council	session	on	28-29	June,	François	Hollande	unexpectedly	sab-
otaged	 the	 German	 plan	 to	 appoint	Wolfgang	 Schäuble,	 Germany’s	minister	 of	 finance,	
as	president	of	the	Eurogroup.	A	week	before	the	summit,	France	indicated	that	it	would	
put	up	 its	own	candidate	 for	 this	position,	the	finance	minister	Pierre	Moscovici.	Germa-
ny	was	 forced	 to	withdraw	Schäuble’s	 candidature,	 and	 ultimately	 Jean-Claude	 Juncker,	
the	current	head	of	the	eurozone	finance	ministers’	group,	retained	his	position.	However,	
Germany	has	lost	in	this	personal	dispute:	in	order	to	boost	Schäuble’s	chances	of	taking	over	
leadership	of	the	Eurogroup,	Berlin	decided	not	to	seek	the	re-election	of	Thomas	Mirow	as	
head	of	the	European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development.	In	a	very	similar	manner,	
France	managed	in	early	2012	to	block	the	appointment	of	Joerg	Asmussen	to	the	position	
of	the	ECB’s	chief	economist,	putting	up	its	own	contender	at	the	last	moment.
Moreover,	François	Hollande’s	first	decisions	in	the	sphere	of	security	and	defence	have	also	
caused	consternation	in	Berlin:	Hollande	has	announced	the	withdrawal	of	French	troops	
from	Afghanistan	(in	the	election	campaign	he	pledged	to	withdraw	troops	by	the	end	of	
2012,	and	not	by	 the	end	of	2014,	 like	 the	remaining	states).	Before	 the	NATO	summit	
in	Chicago,	the	German	minister	of	defence	Thomas	de	Maiziere	appealed	to	Hollande	to	
change	his	stance,	but	the	latter	merely	toned	down	his	declarations.	Berlin	was	much	more	
alarmed	by	the	French	president’s	suggestion	made	on	30	May	regarding	the	possibility	of	
a	military	intervention	in	Syria.	Germany	was	surprised	by	Hollande’s	statement,	as	it	had	
been	by	Sarkozy’s	earlier	efforts	to	build	a	coalition	to	attack	Libya.
Hollande’s	predecessor	has	also	left	him	with	a	German-French	conflict	in	EADS,	the	Eu-
ropean	armaments	corporation,	that	has	been	brewing	since	at	least	the	end	of	President	
Jacques	Chirac’s	 term.	The	 rivalry	between	managers	 from	Germany	and	France	 for	 the	
decisive	voice	in	the	company	is	far	more	than	just	a	matter	of	prestige.	Berlin	is	(rightly)	
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concerned	that	 if	 the	French	prevail,	 then	defence	 factories	 located	 in	Germany	will	 lose	
their	importance,	employees	may	be	laid	off,	and	Germany	may	be	cut	off	from	new	tech-
nologies4.
It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 ‘Merkozy’	 duo	 proved	 successful	 in	 solving	 problems	 of	 EU	
economic	policy,	although	this	did	not	keep	Sarkozy	from	competing	with	Merkel	even	in	
this	sphere,	especially	in	personal	matters.	In	other	fields,	however,	the	duo	was	much	less	
serene.	Sarkozy	tried	to	compensate	for	his	dependence	on	Angela	Merkel	in	EU	financial	
policy	by	demonstrating	his	autonomy	and	attempts	 to	shape	the	EU’s	position	on	other	
issues.	For	example,	in	2009,	during	the	NATO	summit	in	Strasbourg	commemorating	the	
60th	anniversary	of	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty,	Nicolas	Sarkozy	announced	his	country’s	re-
turn	to	the	integrated	military	structures	of	NATO.	The	negotiations	regarding	this	return	had	
been	conducted	exclusively	with	Washington	and	London.	Some	German	experts	interpreted	
this	as	a	sign	of	disrespect	for	Berlin,	and	a	desire	to	keep	Germany	in	the	second	division	
when	it	comes	to	security	and	defence	policy	issues5.	Likewise,	the	intervention	in	Libya	
performed	by	France	and	Britain	led	to	the	temporary	isolation	of	Germany	in	the	West,	and	
triggered	a	domestic	discussion	very	similar	to	the	one	that	swept	through	Germany	in	1991	
during	the	intervention	in	Iraq6.
Another	point	of	contention	has	been	nuclear	power.	In	September	2007,	during	a	meet-
ing	between	Merkel	and	Sarkozy	 in	Meseberg,	 the	 then	French	president	stated	 that	his	
country	 perceives	 nuclear	 power	 as	 the	
energy	 of	 the	 future,	 and	 he	 could	 not	
imagine	 Germans	 going	 the	 other	 way.	
An	 indirect	 response	was	 given	 to	 him	by	
Sigmar	 Gabriel,	 Germany’s	 then	 environ-
ment	minister;	in	an	interview	for	the	Tages- 
spiegel daily,	 Gabriel	 said	 that	 nuclear	
power	belonged	to	the	past.	The	situation	
became	even	more	 complicated	when	 in	
June	2011,	following	the	nuclear	plant	ac-
cident	in	Fukushima,	Germany	decided	to	
abandon	nuclear	energy	completely.	Even	
though	Hollande	promised	to	close	two	reactors	at	the	Fessenheim	power	plant	in	Alsace	
during	his	five-year	term	of	office,	this	is	as	much	as	can	be	expected,	since	75%	of	the	
electricity	consumed	in	France	comes	from	nuclear	energy7.
Different visions of Europe
At	 the	 root	 of	 the	German-French	dispute	 lie	 differences	 in	 their	 vision	 of	 the	European	
Union’s	future	shape.	These	differences,	for	their	part,	result	from	these	countries’	specific	
definition	of	their	 identity,	role	and	interests	in	the	world.	Germany	is	convinced	that	the	
only	way	out	of	the	crisis	and	of	avoiding	it	in	the	future	is	to	strengthen	European	integra-
tion	by	establishing	a	strong	political	union.	This	would	guarantee	the	efficiency	of	a	fiscal	
and	banking	union.	The	political	union	would	strengthen	the	competences	of	the	EU	institu-
tions,	including	the	Commission	and	the	European	Parliament.	Germany	has	presented	its	
detailed	proposals	on	several	different	occasions.	During	the	ruling	CDU	party’s	congress	in	
November	2011,	the	proposals	presented	included	electing	the	head	of	the	Commission	by	
a	popular	vote	by	all	citizens	of	the	EU	states,	and	a	bicameral	parliament,	with	an	lower	
chamber	elected	by	universal	suffrage	(as	the	European	Parliament	is	currently	elected),	and	
an	upper	chamber	made	up	of	representatives	of	the	member	states’	governments8.	Both	
chambers	would	have	the	right	of	legislative	initiative.	Given	Germany’s	population,	political	
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and	economic	potential,	implementing	such	proposals	could	translate	into	the	strengthen-
ing	of	Berlin’s	influence	on	decision-making	processes	in	the	EU.	German	finance	minister	
Wolfgang	 Schäuble,	 upon	 receiving	 the	 Charlemagne	 Prize	 in	May	 2012,	 expressed	 his	
support	for	the	direct	election	of	the	EU	President.	He	also	appealed	for	further	political	in-
tegration	and	the	reform	of	the	EU	institutions.	According	to	the	minister,	the	democratic	le-
gitimacy	of	European	institutions	must	be	strengthened	through	the	direct	election	of	the	EU	
President,	who	would	become	the	political	head	of	the	EU	executive,	i.e.	the	transformed	
European	Commission.	He	also	repeated	his	appeal	for	the	bicameral	European	Parliament	
to	be	granted	the	right	of	legislative	initiative.	These	proposals	were	also	included	in	a	re-
port	by	the	so-called	group	for	the	future	of	
the	European	Union,	published	on	19	June	
(the	group	consists	of	the	foreign	ministers	
of	ten	EU	states,	and	its	informal	meetings	
were	initiated	by	Guido	Westerwelle).
The	 proposal	 to	 transfer	 more	 power	 to	
the	EU	institutions	has	been	very	strongly	
criticised	in	France,	which	traditionally	fa-
vours	the	intergovernmental	model	of	gov-
ernance	 in	 the	EU	and	 the	strengthening	
of	national	governments	 in	the	decision-making	process.	 It	should	be	noted	that	when	 it	
speaks	of	‘national	governments’,	France	means	the	major	EU	countries,	without	regard	to	
the	Central	European	states.	Moreover,	Gaullist	ideas	are	still	strongly	rooted	in	the	outlook	
of	the	French	political	class,	that	is,	opposition	to	the	federalisation	of	Europe	and	the	trans-
fer	of	too	many	powers	to	the	EU	institutions9.	Such	views	are	shared	by	an	influential	group	
within	 the	 ruling	Socialist	Party,	which	 includes	 the	 foreign	minister	 Laurent	 Fabius	 and	
the	junior	minister	for	European	affairs	Bernard	Cazeneuve.
Forecast
The	 socialists’	 coming	 to	 power	 in	 France	 does	 not	 equal	 a	 redefinition	 of	 the	 existing	
aspirations	and	interests	of	France	or	Germany.	Therefore,	no	substantial	change	in	the	bi-
lateral	relations	should	be	expected.	France	remains	a	country	whose	economic	growth	de-
pends	mainly	on	domestic	demand,	while	in	the	case	of	Germany	this	is	fuelled	by	exports.	
For	Paris,	military	power	 is	as	 important	 (if	not	more	 important)	 in	determining	 its	posi-
tion	as	economic	efficiency.	In	Berlin,	no	political	party	represents	this	kind	of	approach.	
At	the	same	time,	despite	all	these	differences	–	and	often,	paradoxically,	due	to	them	–	
Germany	and	France	will	remain	the	moving	spirit	of	the	EU.	These	two	states,	backed	by	
their	allies,	are	bound	to	set	the	tone	in	the	debate	about	the	EU’s	future,	both	by	striking	up	
tactical	alliances	(as	when	negotiating	the	new	budget	perspective)	and	by	competing	(as	in	
their	negotiations	on	how	to	fight	the	crisis).	Ultimately,	Germany	and	France	are	bound	to	
compromise,	due	to	the	size	of	their	populations	and	their	economic	potential.
•	 The	 victory	 for	 the	 Socialist	 Party	 in	 the	 June	 elections	 has	 given	 it	 a	 parliamentary	
majority	 and	 provided	 François	 Hollande	 with	 a	 very	 strong	 political	 position.	 In	 his	
European	policy,	he	is	no	longer	dependent	on	the	domestic	political	scene	(where	the	
opposition	UMP	party	opposes	any	increase	in	expenditure,	while	the	Communist	Left	
is	against	excessive	cuts),	or	on	the	support	of	other	parties	in	the	French	parliament.	
France	will	be	consistent	in	raising	its	objections	to	German	proposals	of	how	to	tackle	
the	crisis,	principally	because	they	run	counter	to	the	French	economic	model.	However,	
these	objections	are	also	an	attempt	to	defend	France’s	political	position	within	the	EU	
Despite all differences – and often, 
paradoxically, due to them – 
Germany and France will remain 
the moving spirit of the EU. 
These two states, backed by their 
allies, are bound to set the tone 
in the debate about the EU’s future.
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and	to	counteract	Berlin’s	attempt	to	dominate	the	decision-making	processes.	This	was	
another	reason	why	Hollande	approached	other	large	EU	countries,	such	as	Spain	and	
Italy,	for	support.	Moreover,	France’s	economic	condition	has	deteriorated	(as	in	Italy	and	
Spain),	and	it	is	seeking	to	distribute	the	costs	of	the	crisis	among	all	the	states.	Germany	
will	keep	opposing	this,	as	it	is	unwilling	to	bear	the	cost	of	the	crisis	in	other	countries.
•	 In	the	long	term,	Hollande	hopes	that	the	Social	Democrats	win	next	year’s	elections	in	
Germany,	as	it	will	be	easier	for	him	to	come	to	an	understanding	with	the	SPD.	But	for	
the	moment,	France	is	likely	to	seek	a	compromise	with	Berlin,	or	try	to	postpone	the	
key	decisions.	In	principle,	France’s	weaker	negotiating	position	(resulting	from	its	worse	
economic	situation)	does	not	mean	it	will	have	less	influence	on	the	key	decisions	within	
the	EU,	as	testified	by	the	dispute	regarding	the	management	of	the	Eurogroup.
•	 In	European	security	policy,	Hollande’s	first	statements	(such	as	on	the	situation	in	Syria)	
may	indicate	that	he	does	not	intend	to	abandon	the	policy	of	involvement	during	crises	
in	those	regions	where	France	has	crucial	political	and	economic	interests	(the	Mediter-
ranean,	Central	and	West	Africa).	Meanwhile,	despite	heated	internal	debates	recurring	
every	few	years,	Germany	will	continue	to	stick	to	conservative	policies	of	limited	involve-
ment.	This	is	likely	to	cause	recurrent	downturns	in	relations	between	Paris	and	Berlin,	
as	happened	during	Sarkozy’s	term	of	office.
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